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IN HIS OWN WORDS: JUDGE COFFIN AND
WORKABILITY
William C. Kelly, Jr.*
Early in his judicial career, Judge Coffin proffered the concept of
“workability” as one of the core factors in judging. Justice and Workability: Un
Essai, his first published reflection on this idea, appeared in the Suffolk University
Law Review in 1971. To frame the discussion, he started with a formal definition:
“[T]he extent to which a rule protecting a right, enforcing a duty, or setting a
standard of conduct—which is consistent with and in the interests of social
justice—can be pronounced with reasonable expectation of effective observance
without impairing the essential functioning of those to whom the rule applies.”1
This Article explores the ways in which the concept of workability became richer
over time as the Judge limned out its relationship to the decisions of the First
Circuit Court of Appeals and the United States Supreme Court, pitting individual
rights against the imperatives of governmental institutions and the jurisprudence of
the era.
I. FORMATIVE EXPERIENCES
As a backdrop, it bears reviewing briefly Judge Coffin’s long apprenticeship in
government service prior to his appointment to the First Circuit in 1965. His twoterm stint in the 85th and 86th Congresses, from 1957 to 1961, was followed by a
series of executive branch positions in the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations
in the field of foreign aid, including service as Deputy Administrator of the United
States Agency for International Development (AID) from 1961 to 1964, and as
United States representative to the Development Assistance Committee of the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development in 1964-1965. At AID
in particular, he experienced firsthand the challenge and frustration of trying as a
mid-level political appointee to merge and reform an executive branch agency and
the disconcerting experience, after having served in Congress, of dealing from the
outside with Congressional moguls.2 When he took his seat on the Court of
Appeals, he brought the experience and wisdom earned in Congress and the
executive branch. In styling his extraordinary, three-volume autobiography Life
and Times in the Three Branches, the Judge embraced this perspective on his life’s
work.
Less a part of the standard narrative, but explored in his autobiography, is his
earlier experience in government at the local level. After clerking for two years for
United States District Court Judge Robert Clifford in Maine after law school, he
launched a solo law practice in Lewiston, Maine, and was quickly drawn into the
* President, Stewards of Affordable Housing for the Future. B.A. Harvard, 1968; J.D. Yale Law
School, 1971. The Author had the privilege of serving as a law clerk to Judge Coffin during the 19711972 term, and to Supreme Court Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. during the October 1972 term.
1. Frank M. Coffin, Justice and Workability: Un Essai, 5 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 567, 571 (1971).
2. 2 FRANK M. COFFIN, LIFE AND TIMES IN THE THREE BRANCHES 484-515 (2004) [hereinafter
LIFE AND TIMES].
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day-to-day work of local government, first as a member of Lewiston’s underfunded
Board of Education and its Pension and Planning Boards.3 A year later, he became
Lewiston’s part-time Corporation Counsel.
In one sense, workability likely had its origins in these modest roles. Judge
Coffin’s duties exposed him first hand to the pressures of local self-government
and its chronic shortage of time and resources. Night meetings of the city boards
competed with law practice and family life.4 As it turned out, many of the toughest
cases the First Circuit faced during his tenure, and many of the most significant
opinions the Judge wrote for the court, would concern the laws and practices of
state and local government.
II. WORKABILITY IN ACTION
A sampling of Judge Coffin’s opinions from the decade surrounding his
Suffolk University Law Review piece illustrates a variety of contexts in which he
found that workability had application across a range of local, state, and federal
institutions. In each opinion, the Judge, writing for the court, took pains to view
the case from the perspective of the implementing body. Empathetic to his core,
Judge Coffin also believed deeply in transparency and dialogue. He brought to his
every public endeavor the belief of a determined optimist that the participants could
educate one another as they worked together towards a better future.
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potentially causing administrators to become over-cautious in their initial hiring
and to avoid the “time, expense, and often the personal discomfort of a full scale
hearing”10 by keeping teachers that should be let go. In a statement that surely took
much of its meaning from his personal service on an overworked school board,
Judge Coffin wrote that imposing an adjudicative hearing to flush out possible bad
faith “would spawn a host of other problems not the least of which would be the
erosion of the educational policy function of school boards.”11
The Judge recognized that judicial sensitivity to the demands placed on an
institution required reciprocity on the side of the institution. Workability
sometimes foundered on the shoals of recalcitrance. In Morgan v. Kerrigan,12 the
Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s judgment that the Boston school
board and other defendants had intentionally created or maintained racial
discrimination in several respects.13 It was clear that dialogue had failed in the face
of official defiance. Judge Coffin’s opinion for the court invoked Justice
Frankfurter’s concurrence in Cooper v. Aaron,14 quoting its key passage: “‘Only
the constructive use of time will achieve what an advanced civilization demands
and the Constitution confirms.’ And the constructive use of time necessarily
depends upon ‘the fruitful exercise of the responsibility of those charged with
political official power.’”15
B. Draft Boards
Controversies growing out of the Vietnam War also populated the court’s
docket in the late 1960s and early 1970s. While several cases dealt with wider
public controversies,16 most were appeals from convictions of young men for
refusing to submit for induction into the military. Like school boards, Selective
Service System draft boards were then, and still are, composed of local volunteers,
and considerations of workability were featured prominently in Judge Coffin’s
opinions.
Typically, the appellants in the draft cases challenged the decisions of local
draft boards to classify them as eligible to be drafted, and multiple opinions by
Judge Coffin conveyed decisions reversing convictions or remanding cases for
further proceedings. The opinions were careful to take into account the local,
volunteer character of draft boards. Sounding a note that would persist through
other cases, Judge Coffin wrote for the court in Talmanson v. United States,17 that
“[s]o long as we have a system entrusting the application of national policy to local
10. Id. at 1186.
11. Id. at 1187. In Drown II, the court declined to interpose itself further after finding sufficient the
school board’s statement that the teacher’s department had found her uncooperative in various respects.
Drown II, 451 F.2d at 1109.
12. 509 F.2d 580 (1st Cir. 1974).
13. Id. at 588.
14. 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
15. Morgan, 509 F.2d at 598 (quoting Cooper, 358 U.S. at 25).
16. See, e.g., In re Ellsberg, 446 F.2d 954 (1st Cir. 1971); Massachusetts v. Laird, 451 F.2d 26 (1st
Cir. 1971); United States v. Doe, 460 F.2d 328 (1st Cir. 1972); United States v. Spock, 416 F.2d 165
(1st Cir. 1969).
17. 386 F.2d 811 (1st Cir. 1967).
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units vested with discretion, there will be—as, indeed, it is intended that there be—
variations in assessing area needs and availabilities.”18 When a draftee argued that
an order issued by a clerk to implement a board decision deprived him of the right
to have the board exercise its discretion, the court concluded in another opinion by
Judge Coffin that “[t]o rule as a matter of law that every order to report must be the
subject of board action seems to us a requirement unnecessarily burdensome on
local boards and not demanded by the duty to treat registrants fairly.”19
In United States v. Baldridge,20 another registrant challenged a regulation that
cut off new claims of deferment when a draft notice had been mailed. Unwilling to
require endless process, the court, through Judge Coffin, declined to overturn the
regulation, noting that “[b]ut for the regulation, a large percentage of those
receiving induction notices might attempt to avoid induction by suddenly
unearthing deferrable pursuits. The effect on the ability smoothly to supply the
needs of the military for draftees could well be disastrous.”21 The case before it,
though, presented unusual circumstances—the registrat had accepted an
employment offer from the Peace Corps before the issuance of the draft notice—
that the court felt merited relief and should be accommodated by the board.22
“[T]he local boards would not be unduly burdened by the need to reopen the
classifications of the few who are likely to be situated similarly to [the
appellant].”23
C. Prison Officials
Challenges to the rules imposed by state prison officials raised analogous
questions about the extent to which a judicial decision might impose processes that
would hinder the ability of the officials to do their basic work, even though those
officials are paid government employees rather than citizen volunteers. In Nolan v.
Fitzpatrick,24 the court faced a claim by a state prisoner that he had a constitutional
right to send letters to the news media concerning conditions in Massachusetts’
Walpole prison, where he was confined.25 After careful analysis of the burden
imposed on prison officials by their felt need to review prisoners’ letters to the
press and perhaps make a public response, the court concluded that the burden was
modest and warranted.26 Ever alert to the possibility of dialogue27 with institutional

18. Id. at 812.
19. United States v. Powers, 413 F.2d 834, 841 (1st Cir. 1969). See also Frank M. Coffin, Chief
Judge, U.S. Ct. of App. for the 1st Cir., Address at the Examiner Club: The Continuing Quest for
Principle 33 (Nov. 5, 1973) (on file with Author) [hereinafter Address at the Examiner Club] (“[E]ven
the best constituted lay draft board must be given some leeway. And if they were held to the punctilio
of perfection, they would simply not be able to carry out their function.”).
20. 454 F.2d 403 (1st Cir. 1972).
21. Id. at 406.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. 451 F.2d 545 (1st Cir. 1971).
25. Id. at 546. See also Nolan v. Scafati, 430 F.2d 548, 550 (1st Cir. 1970) (allegation of refusal to
forward a prisoner’s letter to the Massachusetts Civil Liberties Union states a claim that prison
disciplinary proceedings deprived him of access to the courts).
26. Fitzpatrick, 451 F.2d at 550.
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defendants, Judge Coffin, writing for the court, added a postscript to highlight a
“welcome constructive step”: “Subsequent to argument in this case, we have been
informed by counsel that defendants have voluntarily adopted new procedures
permitting outgoing mail of prisoners to be sent without restriction as to
addressees.”28
Palmigiano v. Baxter29 posed the question whether the prison system was
required as a matter of due process to provide counsel to prisoners in disciplinary
hearings.30 For the court, Judge Coffin wrote:
[W]e do not feel that prison disciplinary hearings necessarily require
professionally trained counsel. The requirement of professionally trained counsel
in all cases could amount to a significant expense for the government, both in
supplying counsel for the accused and, because the hearing is likely to become
more adversarial as a result, in prolonging the proceeding and making it necessary
31
for the state to be represented by its own attorney.

Fano v. Meachum32 again addressed the due process rights of prisoners. Judge
Coffin wrote that the Massachusetts prison system could not transfer a prisoner to a
higher security prison based on informants’ confidential statements.33 The Judge
took comfort in the fact that another prison in the same system had implemented a
regulation barring the acceptance of informant statements without the presence of
the accused.34 Judge Coffin noted that “the prison system itself had decided that it
could live with the requirement of a hearing without difficulty.”35
D. The Police
A case that shuttled between the United States District Court in Massachusetts
and the Court of Appeals illustrates the dynamic between general principles and
practicality in the ongoing relationship of the federal courts with state and local
government. Castro v. Beecher36 led the First Circuit into the treacherous waters of
de facto racial discrimination in the North. At the time, blacks constituted 16.3%
of Boston’s population but only 3.6% of its police force.37 The case involved a
challenge by black and Spanish-speaking plaintiffs to the hiring practices for
policemen in Massachusetts, principally a civil service examination that screened
out a disproportionate percentage of black and Hispanic candidates.38
27. The Judge saw dialogue between the courts and other governmental institutions as a corollary to
workability: “[W]hen judges succeed in involving the parties in working out institutional changes, more,
much more is accomplished than settling the rights and liabilities of the parties to the dispute.” Address
at the Examiner Club, supra note 19, at 38.
28. Fitzpatrick, 451 F.2d at 551.
29. 487 F.2d 1280 (1st Cir. 1973).
30. Id. at 1290.
31. Id. at 1291.
32. 520 F.2d 374 (1st Cir. 1975).
33. Id. at 379-80.
34. Id. at 380.
35. FRANK M. COFFIN, ON APPEAL: COURTS, LAWYERING, AND JUDGING 291 (1994).
36. 459 F.2d 725 (1st Cir. 1972).
37. Id. at 728.
38. Id.
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The district court judge was the often prickly Charles E. Wyzanski, Jr.39 Judge
Wyzanski saw the record as establishing that the test unfairly discriminated not
simply against the black and Spanish-speaking plaintiffs and the class they sought
to represent, but more broadly against “minorities which did not share the
prevailing white culture: that is . . . groups such as blacks, yellows, browns,
American Indians, persons reared in lands where the preferred language is not
English, and even whites from backwood areas.”40 After finding the test not to be
related to qualifications needed to be a policeman, he ordered the Massachusetts
Civil Service Commission to develop and use a new, job-related test, but provided
no other relief.41
Writing for the Court of Appeals, Judge Coffin observed that Judge
Wyzanski’s characterization of the case as sweeping in the rights of everyone not
in the mainstream “raises problems of riparian definition and proof which argue for
the recognition of less comprehensive claims, at least those claims which have
independent historical or decisional support.”42 There was no effective way for the
courts to provide an effective remedy for the entire range of persons disadvantaged
on Judge Wyzanski’s sweeping principle. The Court of Appeals went on to fashion
narrower relief, instructing the court below to create a priority pool of black and
Spanish-surnamed applicants who failed the earlier test but pass a new nondiscriminatory test and then to require the hiring of one applicant from the priority
pool for ever(ppea3qalica.5(t)-(ru)(t)-5h8(r evree o)(t)-5h8(r ev)10.3o)-.6(e(t)-5i(t)-5ci)4.8((i)-7.(m)22.5.1(s)8( )-12.
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III. WORKABILITY, PRINCIPLE, AND THE STANDARD OF HISTORY
As Judge Coffin’s thinking continued to evolve, he recognized that
“workability,” as he had formulated the concept in his Suffolk University Law
Review article, was more a self-imposed curb on personal predilection than a
source of affirmative guidance for evaluating claims of constitutional or statutory
rights.47 Nor was that surprising, since the Suffolk article and much of his other
writing was penned to defend the legitimacy of the work of unelected judges or, put
another way, their accountability. He was at pains to show that the hands of judges
are usually tied by precedent and, when not so tied, are limited in range by the
requirements of craft,48 leaving a judge little room for imposition of his own values
except in unusual cases.49
But the Judge was not satisfied—his intellectual ambition required that he find
a disciplined approach to those unusual cases. At least as early as 1972,50 he began
to imagine the book that would become The Ways of a Judge: Reflections from the
Federal Appellate Bench, and set out to explore more deeply the current state of
jurisprudence, hoping to find ideas that would help him think more systematically
about the affirmative role of courts in government and society. This was at a time
when the continuing influence of Warren Court decisions on the Supreme Court
still empowered the lower courts to explore the meaning of constitutional rights in
contemporary society. As Supreme Court doctrine evolved during his tenure to
become more confining of the lower courts,51 delicate balancing and workability
began to play out less frequently in the Judge’s opinions than in his speeches and
extra-judicial writings. Despite the reduced scope allowed for application of his
ideas to cases before his court, the Judge continued to take seriously the need for an
intellectually consistent framework for judicial decision-making in cases not
resolved by precedent or craft alone. In his words, “[t]he problem for a judge, and
particularly for a Justice of the Supreme court of a nation or of a state, is to decide
within his or her area of freedom in a principled manner.”52
In The Continuing Quest for Principle, a paper the Judge presented to Boston’s

47. Id. at 25 (“There were two deficiencies in my attempt, my “essai.” The first was my lack of any
focus on principle . . . . I was looking only at considerations [restraining] courts—not at considerations
pushing them. It was basically a negative formulation.”).
48. The Judge later referred to these craft constraints as “principles to harness judges.” FRANK M.
COFFIN, THE WAYS OF A JUDGE: REFLECTIONS FROM THE FEDERAL APPELLATE BENCH 216 (1980).
49. In an insightful book review of The Ways of a Judge and On Appeal, Judge Lipez, Judge
Coffin’s successor once removed, emphasized the importance to Judge Coffin of legitimizing the role of
the courts through discipline, self-awareness, and transparency. Kermit V. Lipez, 10 J. APP. PRAC. &
PROCESS 371 (2009) (book review) (reprinted in this issue).
50. Memorandum from Frank M. Coffin, Judge, U.S. Ct. of App. for the 1st Cir., to the Author
(May 21, 1972) (on file with Author).
51. In On Appeal, Judge Coffin wrote about several decisions of the Court of Appeals involving
opinions he had written that the Supreme Court overruled or reversed. ON APPEAL, supra note 35, at
290-93. Other opinions reflected the new boundaries. For example, the First Circuit felt itself
“compelled by the present state of the authorities” to caution the district court to “take into account
rational positions advanced by the prison authorities.” Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 561 F.2d 411, 420 (1st Cir.
1977).
52. Frank M. Coffin, Book Review, 56 B.U. L. REV. 1029, 1035 (1976) (reviewing ALEXANDER M.
BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT (1975)) [hereinafter Book Review].
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august Examiner Club in 1973,53 he surmised that jurisprudential principles might
enable a judge to steer the judicial ship, giving it both a destination and a set of
markers to assure accountability beyond craft.54 What commanded most of his
attention were the rights of individuals against governmental institutions at all
levels, and it was mainly for cases involving those rights that he sought a principled
basis for decision.55
In the Examiner Club paper, the Judge began a journey through what he called
the “headlands” of American jurisprudence, a tour that culminated in The Ways of a
Judge.56 While full reviews of the paper and book are beyond the scope of this
Article, brief stops at a few of the “headlands” will help chart his evolving course.
Among mid-20th century schools of jurisprudence, Judge Coffin looked closely
at the “legal process school.”57 Notably, Professor Herbert Wechsler had called for
the use of “neutral principles” as a benchmark to control judicial subjectivism. In
Wechsler’s formulation, “[a] principled decision . . . is one that rests on reasons
with respect to all the issues in the case, reasons that in their generality and their
neutrality transcend any immediate result that is involved.”58 On closer analysis,
though, the Judge concluded that candidate neutral principles often conflict with
one another.59 Moreover, as Castro v. Beecher well illustrated, a neutral principle
that is overbroad risks leaving a court unable to fashion a remedy commensurate
with the rights it has identified. What steps could a court order to remedy the
cultural and educational disadvantages of “whites from backwoods areas?” If no
principle could be a basis for judicial decision making unless it could be applied to
the full extent of its internal logic, then the courts would be unable to carry out
their core function of making judgments among competing interests and values.
Other legal process scholars urged courts to avoid imposing their own values
by showing extreme restraint in overturning the decisions of the other branches.
While this approach largely obviated the need to balance individual rights against
53. The paper was presented on November 5, 1973. The presence at the evening meeting of his law
school professors Paul Freund and Milton Katz made the Judge “somewhat nervous,” especially in that
Professor Freund had read and commented on draft chapters of John Rawls’ A Theory of Justice, one of
the works the Judge intended to discuss that evening. Letter from Frank M. Coffin to the Author (Nov.
13, 1974) (on file with Author). The Judge would later serve as President of the Examiner Club.
54. Address at the Examiner Club, supra note 19, at 39-40.
55. For all his interest in the Federalist Papers and the separation of powers among the federal
branches and the division between the federal and state governments, the Judge chose not to focus in his
extra-judicial writing on the adjudication of issues under what he called the “great structural provisions”
of the Constitution. See ON APPEAL, supra note 35, at 276. But see Frank M. Coffin, The Federalist
Number 86: On Relations Between the Judiciary and Congress, in THE BROOKINGS INST., JUDGES AND
LEGISLATORS: TOWARD INSTITUTIONAL COMITY 21 (Robert A. Katzmann ed. 1988) [hereinafter The
Federalist].
56. See THE WAYS OF A JUDGE, supra note 48, at 206-14, 231-49. As he often did in his writing,
Judge Coffin made elegant use of nautical imagery, in the Author’s view a delightful substitute for the
tedium of sports and military imagery.
57. See generally HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC
PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW (Cambridge Tentative ed. 1958).
58. Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 19
(1959) (quoted in Address at the Examiner Club, supra note 19, at 12).
59. In support of this point, Judge Coffin referred to Alexander Bickel’s The Least Dangerous
Branch: “[T]he question left unanswered is how may a court choose between competing principles, both
adequately neutral and general.” Address at the Examiner Club, supra note 19, at 12.
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society’s interests, in Judge Coffin’s view it was itself value-laden. To make his
point, the Judge parsed the Supreme Court’s decision in Fano v. Meachum,60
reversing Fano v. Meachum and holding that a prisoner has no right to due process
before being transferred to a harsher prison:
[I]t depends on one’s starting point. If society’s rights as reflected in state
legislative and executive decisions are presumptively superior, the Court was
restrained in declining to interfere with those decisions. But if one begins with the
assumption of the presumptive priority of individual rights, a decision burdening
the individual without any strong showing of governmental need could
61
legitimately be said to be activist.

To Judge Coffin, both “neutral principles” and “judicial restraint” seemed in
practice to default to a passive approach that effectively downgraded individual
rights by giving undue deference to only arguable governmental justifications for
restricting those rights.
More congenial to the Judge’s own thinking was Professor Ronald Dworkin’s
thesis that the great constitutional rights, notably including the rights of due process
and equal protection, should be viewed as broad “concepts,” not as botched
attempts to state detailed “conceptions”62 and therefore are properly interpreted in
context over time. As Judge Coffin wrote, “[t]he emphasis on fairness, the
entitlement of each person to equal respect, the view of the great clauses in the Bill
of Rights as concepts, susceptible of adjustment in each era rather than as fixed,
specific conceptions . . . spell a different, individual oriented jurisprudence.”63
Another source of stimulus for Judge Coffin was the ambitious rethinking of
the contractarian approach to moral philosophy put forth by Harvard philosophy
professor John Rawls in A Theory of Justice.64 Rawls argued, among other things,
that persons in the “original position” (that is, in ignorance of their personal
situations) would agree to a nearly absolute priority for individual liberty over other
goals, such that “[e]ach person [would] have an equal right to the most extensive
total system of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for
all.”65 The Judge explored the extent to which any of this thinking about the
primacy of individual rights could be useful to a judge.66 Although attracted to the
moral content of this principle, and prepared to use the social contract as at least a
metaphor,67 the Judge was cognizant of his role. “[J]udges generally are confined
to enforcing society’s justice and that justice is often founded on notions different
from our considered judgments in ‘reflective equilibrium.’”68 He also noted that in
an imperfect world, an absolute priority for liberty could not be implemented
through litigation “without bringing government to a halt.”69
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

427 U.S. 215 (1976).
THE WAYS OF A JUDGE, supra note 48, at 220.
RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 134 (1977).
THE WAYS OF A JUDGE, supra note 48, at 240.
JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
Id. at 550.
Address at the Examiner Club, supra note 19, at 30-33.
Book Review, supra note 52, at 1037.
Address at the Examiner Club, supra note 19, at 33.
THE WAYS OF A JUDGE, supra note 48, at 238.
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Moving beyond “principle” alone, the Judge came to the view that the standard
for assessing the rightness or wrongness of close decisions must be the ultimate
verdict of history. For a judge deciding live cases, that standard demands both a
deep understanding of how our society has evolved and an ability to see over the
horizon.
A central reality to Judge Coffin, as he framed the role of individual rights in
the late 20th century, was that institutions had come to dominate and regulate our
lives. “We are now intensely urban . . . [and] rely more heavily on institutions.”70
“From childhood on, we become creatures of institutions—public school,
universities, unions, professional associations, regulatory commissions, laws
governing our occupations and our recreations. If we become ill, old, handicapped,
or convicts, we live our lives in institutions.”71 Even local government rationing of
mobile home parks puts one citizen’s liberty at the mercy of another.72 In a life
increasingly bounded by institutions, the teaching of Judge Coffin’s opinions and
other writings was that personal freedoms must find some of their scope within
those institutions.
Beyond a current assessment, the Judge wrote, a court must understand where
our society is headed and how institutions and rights will function as our society
and values continue to evolve:
The judge must on the one hand be sensitive to the pace and direction of societal
[evolution] . . . and on the other to his responsibility to stand for the principles of
justice in that evolution. There is room at the margin for a moving edge of
fairness—fairness checked by workability.73

He envisioned a wise decision as a point on a progression to a more just future.74
“It is this nuance about sensing the future shape of value acceptance that . . .
supports [a] view of the Court as a prophet of opinion with attendant responsibility
to move in stages, stimulating colloquy, not in precipitate and premature
formulations.”75
The Judge’s reflections on the many iterations of Morgan v. Kerrigan, the
Boston schools case, and the controversial role of busing as a remedy for racial
discrimination more generally are a case in point:
My own feeling is that in its time busing played a vital role in helping end a
century of racial discrimination by forcing communities to face up to the problem.
It may have outlived its usefulness, but no one has suggested that another policy

70. Id. at 221.
71. Address at the Examiner Club, supra note 19, at 16.
72. See generally Judge Coffin’s opinion in Lavoie v. Bigwood, 457 F.2d 7 (1st Cir. 1972) (holding
that the owner of the sole mobile home park in a town could not use the courts to evict a homeowner
who was active in the tenants’ association for complaining to public officials about management of the
park).
73. Address at the Examiner Club, supra note 19, at 34 (referencing Jan Deutsch for the term
“community agenda”). See also Jan G. Deutsch, Neutrality, Legitimacy, and the Supreme Court: Some
Intersections Between Law and Political Science, 20 STAN. L. REV. 169 (1968).
74. Address at the Examiner Club, supra note 19, at 12-15. See also THE WAYS OF A JUDGE, supra
note 48, at 213-14.
75. Address at the Examiner Club, supra note 19, at 14.
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In a section of On Appeal entitled “The Looming Importance of Community,”
the Judge expressed his deep concern about the perpetuation of a substantial
underclass of the poor people in America, a situation that called for “ways and
means to enable the grievously displaced and disadvantaged to make reentry into
the mainstream of society.”77 Though creating those ways and means was a job
principally for legislatures, he saw a risk that legislatures would not take the
initiative and foresaw a constructive role for courts in a dialogue.78
Having satisfied himself that he had mined the jurisprudence of his era until
the lode petered out, the Judge declared his right and intention to insist on
“pluralism” with respect to how a court should resolve cases not controlled by craft
or precedent.79 In the absence of a grand overarching theory, he took away an
enhanced jurisprudential basis for an emphasis on liberty and equality, giving him
enough “considerations pushing” the courts80 to be a complement to workability.81
IV. LESSONS FOR JUDICIAL BALANCING
Emerging from his jurisprudential journey and at least partly as a result of it,
the Judge reaffirmed his view that courts have an affirmative obligation to take
rights very seriously. That conviction led him to question the Supreme Court’s
evolving approach to the balancing of interests between individual rights and
government operations.
In Judicial Balancing: The Protean Scales of Justice,82 the Judge took the
Supreme Court to task for its sweeping decisions in the 1986 term. Basically, he
charged that the balancing of individual rights against governmental interests was
carried out at such a high level, and with such broad presumed facts, that
government officials were bound to prevail: “[T]he broader the level of generality
of the decision, the greater the compulsion to defer to officialdom.”83 He later
called this pattern of outcomes the “level of generality” problem.84
This article, published in the New York University Law Review, analyzed in
detail three cases decided by the Supreme Court in 1987—Turner v. Safley,85
Griffin v. Wisconsin,86 and O’Connor v. Ortega.87 Of these, Turner v. Safley is of
the most interest for present purposes, since it involved the applicability of
constitutional rights in a prison, a setting with which Judge Coffin had dealt
repeatedly and in a manner sensitive to both prisoners’ rights and workability.
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“The [Supreme] Court reasoned that subjecting all prison officials’ judgments to
strict scrutiny would ‘seriously hamper their ability to anticipate security problems
and adopt innovative solutions . . . and would thereby destroy the decision making
process . . . .’”88 In his view, though, the Supreme Court painted with too broad a
brush: “Safley evidences very broad-scale rulemaking without any factual
landscape showing the variety, frequency, and seriousness of problems raised by
the assertion of the various constitutional rights of prisoners in far-flung and varied
situations.”89
The Judge went on to write that:
In each of those [three Supreme Court] cases the major “balancing” was directed
only to the question whether there should be some relaxation in the traditional
standards of constitutional balancing, and not to the specific needs, interests, and
limitations of the parties; that is, not to the “facts” of the case.90

The result was an almost casual acceptance of administrative excuses for curtailing
individual rights. Judge Coffin noted:
Deference, in the sense of a very substantial withdrawal of judicial review, to any
officer of a government institution with power to inflict harm on an individual is a
step that, in my opinion, should be taken only for the most clearly demonstrated,
91
factually justified, and compelling reasons.

Workability would have made it possible to take individual rights seriously
without undue disruption of the core functioning of public bodies. Whereas Judge
Coffin would have had the courts decide the trio of cases on narrow grounds, take a
close look at the actual facts, and build workability into the balancing analysis and
the remedy, the Court took workability off the table by more or less presuming the
facts and ruling broadly.92 “To me justice is something we approach better on a
retail than a wholesale basis.”93 If a right does not have to be enforced woodenly
and to the full range of its arguable generality, it is easier to contemplate
recognizing it in the first place. The courts can take limited steps, see how
effective or disruptive they are, and adapt.
V. WORKABILITY IN THE MIX
Over time, Judge Coffin refined the idea of workability, broadening its
applicability from cases dealing with institutional regulations to cases dealing with
actions of government institutions and racheting up the level of expectation for
governmental institutions.94 After two centuries, he wrote that the people “are
entitled to reasonably properly run institutions which ought to be able to justify
their actions.”95 Sweeping generalizations about interference with the work of
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Judicial Balancing, supra note 82, at 36 (quoting Safley, 482 U.S. at 79).
Id.
Id. at 38.
Id. at 39.
Id. at 33.
Id. at 40.
See ON APPEAL, supra note 35, at 284.
Id. at 285.
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government officials were unpersuasive: “[My deep] fear is that the centrality of
liberty in our constitutional arrangements is today too often subordinated to
administrative fiat and convenience.”96 He summarized by writing that workability
“couples a sensitivity to individual rights with an equal sensitivity to administrative
capability to carry out institutional missions while affording optimum respect for
those rights.”97
To workability, the Judge added a forward-looking aspect, which he called
“incrementalism.” Like workability itself, incrementalism was not a doctrine but
an approach to hard cases that took into account workability, the lessons he had
drawn from jurisprudence, and his conclusion that history will render the ultimate
verdict. In a 2006 address styled “My Judicial Key Ring,” the Judge explained that
“[t]he third key on [my] ring is incrementalism—a practice of narrowly confining
the scope of most decisions to a principle governing the type of situation presented
by the facts of the case, not a principle that would sweep the broader landscape.”98
An excessive deference to government, in the mode of the Supreme Court
decisions in Turner v. Safley and in Meachum v. Fano, leaves courts unable to
serve as the guardians of core individual rights. On the other hand, as evidenced by
the District Court’s decision in Castro v. Beecher, an overbroad but rights sensitive
principle in a novel case forces a court to choose between a remedy too weak to
cure the violation and one commensurate with the violation but unworkably
extensive and intrusive.99
Judge Coffin’s legacy to all who cherish individual rights includes the core
lesson, drawn from his life experience, that judicial legitimacy and judicial power
to protect individual rights require a level of modesty and respect for the demands
on other institutions of government that is neither dismissive nor blindly
deferential. He taught us that to protect those rights in changing times, courts must
have the wisdom and the courage to experiment, in the best common law tradition,
with incremental solutions.

96. Id. at 281.
97. Id. at 285.
98. Frank M. Coffin, Senior Judge, U.S. Ct. of App. for the 1st Cir., Remarks as the Recipient of the
Morton A. Brody Award for Distinguished Judicial Service 8 (Mar. 19, 2006) (on file with Author).
99. “Issues of policy and issues of workability tend to merge.” The Federalist, supra note 55, at 25.

